Abstract

The problem of planning dialog moves can be viewed as an instance of the more general AI problem of planning with incomplete information and sensing. Sensing actions complicate the planning process since such actions engender potentially infinite state spaces. We adapt the Linear Dynamic Event Calculus (LDEC) to the representation of dialog acts using insights from the PKS planner, and show how this formalism can be applied to the problem of planning mixed-initiative collaborative discourse.

1 Introduction

Successful planning in dynamic domains often requires reasoning about sensing acts which, when executed, update the planner’s knowledge state without necessarily changing the world state. For instance, reading a piece of paper with a telephone number printed on it may provide the reader with the prerequisite information needed to successfully complete a phone call. Such actions typically have very large, even infinite, sets of possible outcomes in terms of the actual sensed value, and threaten to make search impracticable. There have been several suggestions in the AI literature for how to handle this problem, including Moore (1985); Morgenstern (1988); Etzioni et al. (1992); Stone (1998); and Petrick & Bacchus (2002; 2004).

Stone (2000) points out that the problem of planning effective conversational moves is also a problem of planning with sensing or knowledge-producing actions, a view that is also implicit in early “beliefs, desires and intentions” (BDI)-based approaches (e.g., Litman & Allen (1987); Bratman, Israel & Pollack (1988); Cohen & Levesque (1990); Grosz & Sidner (1990)). Nevertheless, most work on dialog planning has in practice tended to segregate domain planning and discourse planning, treating the former as an AI black box, and capturing the latter in large state-transition machines mediated or controlled via a blackboard or “information state” representing mutual belief, updated by specialized rules more or less directly embodying some form of speech-act theory, dialog game, or theory of textual coherence (e.g., Lambert & Carberry (1991); Traum & Allen (1992); Green & Carberry (1994); Young & Moore (1994); Chu-Carroll & Carberry (1995); Matheson, Poesio & Traum (2000); Beun (2001); Asher & Lascarides (2003); Maudet (2003)). Such accounts often lend themselves to optimization using statistical models (e.g., Singh et al. (2002)).

One of the ostensible reasons for making this separation is that indirect speech acts, i.e., achieving coherence via implicatures, abound in conversation. (For instance, Green and Carberry cite studies showing around 13% of answers to Yes/No questions are indirect.) Nevertheless, that very same ubiquity of the phenomenon suggests it is a manifestation of the same planning apparatus as the domain planner, and that it should not be necessary to construct a completely separate specialized planner for dialog acts.

This paper addresses the problem of dialog planning by applying techniques developed in the AI planning literature for handling sensing and incomplete information. To this end, we work with planning domains axiomatized in the language of the
Linear Dynamic Event Calculus (LDEC), but extended with constructs inspired by the knowledge-level conditional planner PKS.

2 Linear Dynamic Event Calculus (LDEC)

The Linear Dynamic Event Calculus (LDEC) (Steedman, 1997; Steedman, 2002) is a logical formalism that combines the insights of the Event Calculus of Kowalski & Sergot (1986), itself a descendant of the Situation Calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969), and the STRIPS planner of Fikes & Nilsson (1971), together with the Dynamic and Linear Logics developed by Girard (1987), Harel (1984), and others.

The particular dynamic logic that we work with here exclusively uses the deterministic “necessity” modality \([\alpha]\). For instance, if a program \(\alpha\) computes a function \(f\) over the integers, then an expression like “\(n \geq 0 \Rightarrow [\alpha](y = f(n))\)” indicates that “in any situation in which \(n \geq 0\), after every execution of \(\alpha\) that terminates, \(y = f(n)\).” We can think of this modality as defining a logic whose models are Kripke diagrams, where accessibility between situations is represented by events defined in terms of the conditions which must hold before an event can occur (e.g., “\(n \geq 0\)”), and the consequences of the event that hold as a result (e.g., “\(y = f(n)\)”).

Thus, actions (or events) in LDEC provide the sole means of change and affect the fluents (i.e., properties) of the world being modelled. Like other dynamic logics, LDEC does not use explicit situation terms to denote the state-dependent values of fluents, but instead, chains together finite sequences of actions using a sequence operator “\(;\)”.

One of the novel features of LDEC is that it mixes two types of logical implication. Besides standard (or intuitionistic) implication \(\Rightarrow\), LDEC follows Bibel et al. (1989) and others in using linear logical implication, denoted by the symbol \(\rightarrow\). Linear implication extends LDEC’s representational power and provides a solution to the frame problem (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969), as we’ll see below.

An LDEC domain is formally described by a collection of axioms. For each action \(\alpha\), a domain includes an action precondition axiom of the form:

\[ L_1 \land L_2 \land \ldots \land L_k \Rightarrow \text{affords}(\alpha), \]

where each \(L_i\) is a fluent or its negation (we discuss affords below), and an effect axiom of the form:

\[ ([\text{affords}(\alpha)] \land \phi) \rightarrow [\alpha]\psi, \]

where \(\phi\) and \(\psi\) are conjunctions of fluents or their negations. LDEC domains can also specify a collection of initial situation axioms of the form:

\[ L_1 \land L_2 \land \ldots \land L_p, \]

where each \(L_i\) is a ground fluent literal. Finally, LDEC domains can include a set of background axioms (e.g., for defining the properties of other modal operators), and a set of simple state constraint axioms (e.g., for encoding inter-fluent relationships). We will not discuss the details of these axioms here.

Action precondition axioms specify the applicability conditions of actions using a special affords fluent. Effect axioms use linear implication to build certain “update rules” directly into the LDEC representation. In particular, the fluents of \(\phi\) in the antecedent of an effect axiom are treated as consumable resources that are replaced by the fluents of \(\psi\) in the consequent when an action \(\alpha\) is applied.\(^1\) \([\text{affords}(\alpha)]\) means that it is not defined whether \(\text{affords}(\alpha)\) still holds after \(\alpha\). All other fluents are unchanged. Thus, LDEC’s use of linear implication builds a STRIPS-style (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971) treatment of action effects into the semantics of the language, which lets us address the frame problem without having to write explicit frame axioms.

Previous work has demonstrated LDEC’s versatility as a language for modelling dialog, by introducing notions of speaker/hearer supposition and common ground (Steedman, 2006). This is achieved by defining a new set of modal operators of the form \([X]\), that designate the participants in the dialog and provide a reference point for the shared beliefs that exist between those participants. For instance, \([S]\) and \([H]\) refer to the “speaker” and “hearer”, respectively, while \([C_{sh}]\) refers to the common ground between speaker and hearer.\(^2\) Using these modalities

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\(^1\)We treat consumed fluents as being made false.

\(^2\)Additional participant modalities can be defined as needed. A set of LDEC background axioms is provided as part of a domain to govern the behaviour of these modalities.
we can write LDEC formulae that capture common propositions that arise in dialog. For instance, [S] \( p \) means “the speaker supposes \( p \)”, [S][H] \( p \) means “the speaker supposes that the hearer supposes \( p \)”, and \([C_{\text{sat}}][X] p \) means “it is common ground between the speaker and hearer that \( X \) supposes \( p \)”. In this paper we extend LDEC even further. First, we recognize the need to model knowledge in LDEC, which is a necessary prerequisite for planning with sensing actions, including those needed for effective discourse. Second, we require that our extended representation lend itself to tractable reasoning, in order to facilitate a practical implementation. Finally, although LDEC supports classical plan generation through proof (Steedman, 2002), prior work has not addressed the problem of translating LDEC domains into a form that can take advantage of recent planning algorithms for reasoning with incomplete information and sensing. For a solution to these problems we turn to the PKS planner.

3 Planning with Knowledge and Sensing (PKS)

PKS (Planning with Knowledge and Sensing) is a knowledge-level planner that can build conditional plans in the presence of incomplete information and sensing (Petrick and Bacchus, 2002; Petrick and Bacchus, 2004). Unlike traditional approaches that focus on modelling the world state and how actions change that state, PKS works at a much higher level of abstraction: PKS models an agent’s knowledge state and how actions affect that knowledge state.

The key idea behind the PKS approach is that the planner’s knowledge state is represented using a first-order language. Since reasoning in a general first-order language is impractical, PKS employs a restricted subset of this language and limits the amount of inference it can perform. This approach differs from those approaches that use propositional representations (i.e., without functions and variables) over which complete reasoning is feasible, or works that attempt to represent complete sets of possible worlds (i.e., sets of states compatible with the planner’s incomplete knowledge) using BDDs, Graphplan-like structures, clausal representations, or other such techniques.

What makes the PKS approach particularly novel is the level of abstraction at which PKS operates. By reasoning at the knowledge level, PKS can avoid some of the irrelevant distinctions that occur at the world level, which gives rise to efficient inference and plans that are often quite “natural”. Although the set of inferences PKS supports is weaker than that of many possible-worlds approaches, PKS can make use of non-propositional features such as functions and variables, allowing it to solve problems that can be difficult for world-level planners.

Like LDEC, PKS is based on a generalization of STRIPS. In STRIPS, the world state is modelled by a single database. In PKS, the planner’s knowledge state, rather than the world state, is represented by a set of five databases whose contents have a fixed, formal interpretation in a modal logic of knowledge. To ensure efficient inference, PKS restricts the types of knowledge (especially disjunctions) each database can model. We briefly describe three of these databases (\( K_f \), \( K_v \), and \( K_w \)) here.

\( K_f \): This database is like a standard STRIPS database except that both positive and negative facts are stored and the closed world assumption is not applied. \( K_f \) can include any ground literal \( \ell \), where \( \ell \in K_f \) means “\( \ell \) is known”. \( K_f \) can also contain knowledge of function values.

\( K_v \): This database stores information about function values that will become known at execution time, such as the plan-time effects of sensing actions that return numeric values. During planning, PKS can use \( K_v \) knowledge of finite-range functions to build multi-way conditional branches into a plan. \( K_v \) function terms also act as “run-time variables”—placeholders for function values that will only be available at execution time.

\( K_w \): This database models the plan-time effects of “binary” sensing actions. \( \phi \in K_w \) means that at plan time the planner either knows \( \phi \) or knows \( \neg\phi \), and that at execution time this disjunction will be resolved. PKS uses such “know-whether” facts to construct binary conditional branches in a plan.

PKS also includes a database (\( K_{\text{le}} \)) of known “exclusive-or” disjunctions and a database (\( LCW \)) for modelling known instances of “local closed world” information (Etzioni et al., 1994).

Actions in PKS are modelled as queries and updates to the databases. Action preconditions are specified as a list of primitive queries about the state.
of the databases: (i) $K_p$, is $p$ known to be true?, (ii) $K_t$, is the value of $t$ known?, (iii) $K_w$, is $p$ known to be true or known to be false (i.e., does the planner know-whether $p$)?, or (iv) the negation of (i)–(iii). Action effects are described by a set of STRIPS-like database updates that specify the formulae to be added to and deleted from the databases. These updates capture the changes to the planner’s knowledge state that result from executing the action.

Using this representation, PKS constructs plans by applying actions in a simple forward-chaining manner: provided an action’s preconditions are satisfied by the planner’s knowledge state, an action’s effects are applied to form a new knowledge state. Conditional branches can be added to a plan provided the planner has $K_w$ or (particular types of) $K_t$ information. For instance, if the planner has $K_w$ information about a formula $p$ then it can add a binary branch to a plan. Along one branch, $p$ is assumed to be known while along the other branch $\neg p$ is assumed to be known. PKS can also use $K_t$ information to denote certain execution-time quantities in a plan. Planning continues along each branch until all branches satisfy the goal.

4 Planning Speech Acts with LDEC/PKS

Our approach to planning dialog acts aims to introduce certain features of PKS within LDEC, with the goal of generating plans using the PKS framework. In this paper we primarily focus on the representational issues concerning LDEC, and simply sketch our approach for completing the link to PKS.

The most important insight PKS provides is its action representation based on simple knowledge primitives: $K/K_t$ “know”, $K_v$ “know value”, and $K_w$ “know whether”. In particular, PKS’s tractable treatment of this information—which underlies its databases and queries—is essential to its ability to build plans with incomplete knowledge and sensing.

In order to model similar conditions of incomplete information in LDEC, we introduce a set of PKS-style knowledge primitives into LDEC in the form of knowledge fluents (Demolombe and Pozos Parra, 2000). Knowledge fluents are treated as ordinary fluents but are understood to have particular meanings with respect to the knowledge state. For instance, in our earlier example of reading a piece of paper with a telephone number printed on it, we could use a knowledge fluent $K_{havePaper}$ to indicate that an agent knows it has the required piece of paper, $K_{phoneNumber}$ to represent the result of reading the phone number from the paper (i.e., the agent “knows the value of the phone number”), and $K_{connected}$ to denote the result of actually dialling the phone number (i.e., the agent “knows whether the call connected successfully”).

In a dialog setting, we must also ground all knowledge-level assertions to particular participants in the dialog, or to the common ground. Otherwise, such references will have little meaning in a multi-agent context. Thus, we couple speaker/hearer modalities together with knowledge fluents to write LDEC expressions like $[S]K_p$ — “the speaker knows $p$”, $[H]K_t$ — “the hearer knows the value of $t$”, or more complex expressions like $[C_{sit}] [H] K_w p$ — “it’s common ground between the speaker and hearer that the hearer knows whether $p$”.

Although we treat knowledge fluents as ordinary fluents in LDEC, we retain their knowledge-level meanings with respect to their use in PKS. Thus, knowledge fluents serve a dual purpose in LDEC. First, they act as queries for establishing the truth of particular knowledge-level assertions (e.g., an action precondition axiom like $[X]K_p \Rightarrow affords(\alpha)$ means “if $X$ knows $p$ then this affords action $\alpha$”). Second, they act as updates that specify how knowledge changes due to action (e.g., an effect axiom like $\{affords(\alpha)\} \rightarrow [\alpha][X]K_t$ means “executing $\alpha$ causes $X$ to come to know the value of $t$”). This correlation between LDEC and PKS is not a coincidence but one, we hope, that will let us use PKS as a target planner for LDEC domains.

We illustrate our LDEC extensions in the following domain axiomatization, which is sufficient to support planning with dialog acts.

4.1 Background Axioms

(1) $[X] p \Rightarrow p$ Supposition Veridicality

(2) $[X] \neg p \Rightarrow \neg[X] p$ Supposition Consistency

(3) $\neg[X] p \Rightarrow [X] \neg[X] p$ Negative Introspection

(4) $[C_{sit}] p \equiv ([S][C_{sit}] p \land [H][C_{sit}] p)$ Common Ground
(5) \([X][C_{XY}]p \Rightarrow [X]p\)

Common Ground Veridicality

4.2 Initial Facts

(6) a. “I suppose Bonnie doesn’t know what train I will catch”
   b. \([S]\neg [B]K_t\text{train}\)

(7) a. “If I know what time it is, I know what train I will catch.”
   b. \([S]K_t\text{time} \Rightarrow [S]K_t\text{train}\)

(8) a. “I don’t know what train I will catch.”
   b. \([S]\neg K_t\text{train}\)

(9) a. “I suppose you know what time it is.”
   b. \([S][H]K_t\text{time}\)

(10) a. “I suppose it’s not common ground that I don’t know what time it is.”
   b. \([S]\neg [C_{SH}]\neg [S]K_t\text{time}\)

4.3 Rules

(11) a. “If X supposes \(p\), and X supposes \(p\) is not common ground, X can tell Y \(p\)”
   b. \([X]p \land [X]\neg [C_{XY}][p] \Rightarrow \text{affords(tell}(X,Y,p))\)

(12) a. “If X tells Y \(p\), Y stops not knowing it and starts to know it.”
   b. \([\text{affords(tell}(X,Y,p))] \land \neg [Y]p \Rightarrow [\text{tell}(X,Y,p)][Y]p\)

(13) a. “If X doesn’t know \(p\) and X supposes \(Y\) does, X can ask Y about it.”
   b. \(\neg [X]p \land [X][Y]p \Rightarrow \text{affords(ask}(X,Y,p))\)

(14) a. “If X asks Y about \(p\), it makes it common ground X doesn’t know it”
   b. \([\text{affords(ask}(X,Y,p))] \Rightarrow [\text{ask}(X,Y,p)][C_{XY}]\neg [X]p\)

Axioms (1) – (5) capture a set of standard assumptions about speaker/hearer modalities and common ground. In (3), we assume the presence of a negative introspection axiom, however, we do not require its full generality in practice.\(^3\)

Axioms (6) – (10) specify a number of initial facts about speaker/hearer suppositions. In particular, (10) asserts a speaker supposition about common ground that illustrates the types of conclusions we typically require. These facts also include two \(K_t\) knowledge fluen ts, \(K_t\text{train}\) and \(K_t\text{time}\). As in PKS, these fluen ts act as placeholders for the values of known functions that can map to a wide range of possible values, but whose definite values may not be known at plan/reasoning time.

Rules (11) – (14) encode action precondition and effects axioms for two speech acts, \(\text{ask}\) and \(\text{tell}\).

Using this axiomatization, we consider the task of constructing two dialog-based plans, as a problem of planning through proof.

4.4 Planning a Direct Speech Act

Goal: I need Bonnie to know which train I’ll catch.

By speaker supposition, the hearer knows what time it is:

\[(15) \Rightarrow [H]K_t\text{time}\] (9b); (1)

The speaker doesn’t know what time it is:

\[(16) \Rightarrow \neg [S]K_t\text{time}\] (8b); (2); (7b)

By speaker supposition, Bonnie doesn’t know what train the speaker will catch:

\[(17) \Rightarrow \neg [B]K_t\text{train}\] (6b); (1)

The speaker supposes it’s not common ground with Bonnie as to what train the speaker will catch:

\[(18) \Rightarrow [S]\neg [C_{SH}]K_t\text{train}\] (8b); (2); (5); (3); (4)

The situation affords \(\text{ask}(S,H,K_t\text{time})\):

\[(19) \Rightarrow \text{affords(ask}(S,H,K_t\text{time}))\] (16); (9b); (13b)

After applying \(\text{ask}(S,H,K_t\text{time})\):

\[(20) \Rightarrow [C_{SH}]\neg [S]K_t\text{time}\] (19); (14b)

The situation now affords \(\text{tell}(H,S,K_t\text{time})\):

\[(21) \Rightarrow \text{affords(tell}(H,S,K_t\text{time}))\]

(15); (20); (4); (5); (11b)

After applying \(\text{tell}(H,S,K_t\text{time})\):

\[(22) \Rightarrow [S]K_t\text{train}\] (21); (16); (12b)

—which means I know what train I will catch:

\[(23) \Rightarrow [S]K_t\text{train}\] (22); (7b)

The situation now affords \(\text{tell}(S,B,K_t\text{train})\)

\[(24) \Rightarrow \text{affords(tell}(S,B,K_t\text{train}))\] (23); (18); (11b)

After applying \(\text{tell}(S,B,K_t\text{train})\):
4.5 Planning an Indirect Speech Act

The original situation also affords telling the hearer that I don’t know the time:

\[ (26) \Rightarrow [S] \neg [S] K_{\text{time}} \]  
\[ (8b); (2); (7); (3) \]

\[ (27) \Rightarrow [S] \neg [C_{\text{sh}}] \neg [S] K_{\text{time}} \]  
\[ (10) \]

\[ (28) \Rightarrow \text{affords}(\text{tell}(S, H, \neg [S] K_{\text{time}})) \]  
\[ (26); (27); (11b) \]

After saying “I don’t know what time it is”—that is, applying the action \( \text{tell}(S, H, \neg [S] K_{\text{time}}) \),

\[ (29) \Rightarrow [C_{\text{sh}}] \neg [S] K_{\text{time}} \]  
\[ (14b) \]

Since (29) is identical to (20), the situation again affords \( \text{tell}(H, S, K_{\text{time}}) \), and the rest of the plan can continue as before.

Asking the time by saying “I don’t know what time it is” would usually be regarded as an indirect speech act. Under the present account, both “direct” and “indirect” speech acts have effects that change the same set of facts about the knowledge states of the participants. Both involve inference. In some sense, there is no such thing as a “direct” speech act. In that sense, it is not surprising that indirect speech acts are so widespread: all speech acts are indirect in the sense of involving inference. Crucially, the plan does not depend upon the hearer identifying the fact that the speaker’s utterance “I don’t know what time it is” had the illocutionary force of a request or question such as “What time is it?”.

From an axiomatic point of view, the above examples illustrate that the reasoning required to achieve the desired conclusions is straightforward—in most cases only direct applications of the domain axioms are used. Most importantly, we do not need to resolve knowledge-level conclusions like \( K_{\text{train}} \) at this level of reasoning and, thus, do not require standard axioms of knowledge to reason about the formulae within the scope of \( K/K_{c}/K_{w} \).

Direct manipulation of fluents like \( K_{\text{train}} \) means that we can manage knowledge and sensing actions in a PKS-style manner in our account. For instance, the above plans result in the conclusion \( [S] K_{\text{time}} \) as a consequence of the \( \text{ask} \) and \( \text{tell} \) actions. The particular effect of “coming to know the value” of time means that we should treat these actions as sensing actions. At the knowledge-level of abstraction, the effects of \( \text{ask} \) and \( \text{tell} \) are no different than the effect produced by reading a piece of paper to come to know a telephone number in our earlier example. This PKS-style use of knowledge fluents also opens up the possibility of constructing conditional plans and, ultimately, planning with PKS itself.

4.6 On So-called Conversational Implicature

The fact that we distinguish speaker suppositions about common ground from the hearer suppositions themselves means that we can include the following rules parallel to (11) and (12) without inconsistency:

\[ (30) \]
\[ a. \text{“X can always say } p \text{ to } Y\text{”} \]
\[ b. \Rightarrow \text{affords}(\text{say}(X, Y, p)) \]

\[ (31) \]
\[ a. \text{“If } X \text{ says } p \text{ to } Y, \text{ and } Y \text{ supposes } \neg p, \text{ then } Y \text{ continues to suppose } \neg p, \text{ and supposes that } \neg p \text{ is not common ground.”} \]
\[ b. \{\text{affords}(\text{say}(X, Y, p))\} \land [Y] \neg p \]
\[ \neg \{[\text{say}(X, Y, p)][Y] \neg p \land [Y] \neg [C] \neg p\} \]

Speakers’ calculations about what will follow from making claims about hearers’ knowledge states extend to what will follow from making false utterances. To take a famous example from Grice, suppose that we both know that you have done me an unfriendly turn:

\[ (32) \]
\[ a. \text{“I know that you are not a good friend”} \]
\[ b. [S] \neg \text{friendship}(h) = \text{good} \]

\[ (33) \]
\[ a. \text{“You know that you are not a good friend”} \]
\[ b. [H] \neg \text{friendship}(h) = \text{good} \]

After applying \( \text{say}(S, H, \text{friendship}(h) = \text{good}) \), say by uttering the following:

\[ (34) \text{You’re a fine friend!} \]

the following holds:

\[ (35) \Rightarrow [H] \neg \text{friendship}(h) = \text{good} \]
\[ \land [H] \neg [C] \neg \text{friendship}(h) = \text{good} \]
\[ (32); (33); (31b) \]

One might not think that getting the hearer to infer something they already know is very useful. However, if we assume a mechanism of attention, whereby things that are inferred become salient, then we have drawn their attention to their trespass. Moreover, the information state that we have brought them to is one that would normally suggest,
via rules like (11) and (12), that the hearer should tell
the original speaker that they are not a fine friend.
Of course, further reflection (via similar rules we
pass over here) is likely to make the hearer unwilling
to do so, leaving them few conversational gambits
other than to slink silently and guiltily away. This of
course is what the original speaker really intended.

4.7 A Prediction of the Theory

This theory explains, as Grice did not, why this trope
is asymmetrical: the following is predicted to be an
ineffectual way to make a hearer pleasantly aware
that they have acted as a good friend:

(36) #You’re a lousy friend!

It is counterproductive to make the hearer think of
the key fact for themselves. Moreover, there is no
reason for them not to respond to the contradiction.
Unlike (34), this utterance is likely to evoke a vocif-
erious correction to the common ground, rather than
smug acquiescence to the contrary, parallel to the
sheepish response evoked by (34).

5 Discussion

We have presented a number of toy examples in this
paper for purposes of exposition: scaling to realistic
domains will raise all the usual problems of knowl-
edge representation that AI is heir to. However, the
update effects (and side-effects) of discourse plan-
ning that we describe are general-purpose. They
are entirely driven by the knowledge state, without
recourse to specifically conversational rules, other
than some very general rules of consistency main-
tenance in common ground. There is therefore some
hope that conversational planning itself is of low
complexity, and that any domain we can actually
plan in, we can also plan conversations about.

According to this theory, illocutionary acts such as
questioning and requesting are discourse sub-
plans that are emergent from the general rules for
maintaining consistency in the common ground and
for manipulating knowledge-level information, such
as the $K_c$ formulae in our examples. Of course,
for practical applications that require efficient exe-
cution, we can always memoize the proofs of such
frequently-used sub-plans in the way that is standard
in Explanation-Based Learning (EBL). For instance,
by treating action sequences as “compound” actions
in the planning process, we would be in effect comp-
iling them into a model of dialog state-change of
the kind that is common in practical dialog manage-
ment. More importantly, the present work offers a
way to derive such models automatically from first
principles, rather than laboriously constructing them
by hand.

In contrast to approaches that reject the planning
model on complexity grounds, e.g., (Beun, 2001),
our choice of a planner with limited reasoning capa-
bilities and knowledge resources—conditions often
cited as underlying human planning and dialog—
aims to address such concerns directly. Furthermore,
the specialized rules governing speech act selection
in alternate approaches can always be adopted as
planning heuristics guiding action choice, if existing
planning algorithms fail to produce sufficient plans.

We have also argued that LDEC, extended with
PKS-style knowledge primitives, is sufficient for
planning dialog actions. Although we have moti-
vated a correspondence between LDEC and PKS,
we have not described how PKS planning domains
can be formed from LDEC axioms. While some of
the mechanisms needed to support a translation
already exist—the compilation of LDEC rules into
PKS queries and database updates is straightforward
and syntactic—we have yet to extend PKS’s infer-
ence rules to encompass speaker/hearer modalities,
and formally prove the soundness of our transla-
tion. We are also exploring the use of PKS’s LCW
database to manage common ground as a form of
closed world information. (For example, if a partici-
pant X cannot establish $p$ as common ground then
X should assume $p$ is not common ground.) Fi-
nally, we require a comprehensive evaluation of our
approach to assess its feasibility and scalability to
more complex dialog scenarios. Overall, we are op-
timistic about our prospects for adapting PKS to the
problem of planning dialog acts.

Acknowledgements

The work reported in this paper was partially funded
by the European Commission as part of the PACO-
PLUS project (FP6-2004-IST-4-27657), and by the
NSF under grant number NSF-IIS-0416128.
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